

BODY

MARTA BADONI

How, with whom and by what routes do we communicate in the analytic situation? What happens, before or in response to a word, when we are in the presence of our patients? How and from where do we draw our responses: from what experiences, from what memories? Is it always good to follow Winnicott in thinking of the psyche indwelling in the soma (mind as established in the body), or should we not rather think of the soma (body) as situated in the psyche (mind), a hidden, but potent prompter? (Johnson, 1987, Ferro, 2014). After all, Gaddini (1980) used to speak of mind and body not as opposed realities, but as a body-mind-body circuit.

In this paper I would like to address the question on several different levels. First, drawing on observations from the literature and my analytic experience, I shall reflect on some aspects of the communication between analyst and patient. Secondly, I shall propose a model of psychoanalytic psychotherapy focused on the body, which I consider useful both as an extension of psychoanalytic work – in that it is especially suitable for encounters with patients whose difficulty lies at the origin, in accessing an “embodied” word, and in the processes of differentiation – and as the personal experience of the analyst, in that it is capable of rendering him or her more permeable to the work of perception.

All this against a background of repeated questions: what is the fate of the individual in the intersubjective relationship? What is the specific role of the mother in the processes of differentiation?

PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ANALYTIC SITUATION

The paradox of the body consists in the fact that it is what makes us unique, but at the same time it is largely indebted to the body and gaze of the other, to the care received, to experiences undergone, and to heredity. It is the visible and tangible expression of the reality of the person, of the difference between the sexes, of the succession of

generations, but it is also the seat of the affections and our constant confrontation with the fact of a boundary (Andreoli, 1989). The story which emerges from these realities acquires its truth from the possibility of attaining a living discourse (Green, 1973) in which the single subjectivities and the impact of the relationship between subjects are present and represented.

The impact can be vertiginous (Quinodoz, 1994), heralding both a possible link and the terror of an inescapable (nameless) fall with no future. The analytic setting with its rhythms and spaces is the site of this impact. I have spoken elsewhere (Badoni, 2008), with reference to the setting, of “thinking arms”, a metaphor which aims to include the ideas of *handling*, *holding* and *container*, but above all to emphasise the primary role of the responsibility taken on by the carer (Chetrit-Vatine, 2004).

I would like to begin by exploring the role of the body in terms of the use we make, or do not make, or make without realising it, of our body when we work with our patients. What is the analyst’s receptive apparatus; what mobilises us to look; what levels of listening does a word provoke; who answers, and on whose behalf? How do we guarantee that this intimate communication (Civitarese, 2008) does not become a *folie à deux*, but as far as possible promotes and preserves the freedom of the individual? How can analytic work facilitate or obstruct the experience of a subjectivity of one’s own, to be employed in the encounter with the other?

Modes of communication between individuals greatly interested Freud, who emphasises the necessity for a special emotional attachment between the analyst and the patient (Freud, 1916, 17-18). I am not citing him here to say that everything has already been said on this subject, but to follow the oscillations of a restless and curious mind, which certainly did not have available what philosophy, linguistics, infant research and the neurosciences make available to us today, but instead had a great capacity for observation and self-observation.

Freud appears to “make use of” reflections on telepathy in order to investigate something else that seems to interest him far more; indeed, he does not speak of telepathy so much as of *telepathic experience*, experience supported by an intense emotional link which creates an attitude of especial receptivity (1921). Luciana Nissim (1989), who takes up this subject along with others (Servadio, 1955; Fachinelli, 1985), goes

beyond the telepathic experience, describing the telepathic relationship, by which she means not only the effect of a link but of a habituation, of the highly distinctive acquaintance which is analysis. In her article (Nissim, 1989), imagining a dialogue between patient and analyst, she writes: «Didn't you take the risk of (Didn't it occur to you that it would be risky,) taking me into analysis? Then have the courage to face the disturbing and the unknown with me.»¹ So I shall try to do this, reflecting on the role the body plays through the reality which it presents, through the work of perception and annotation, and through being subject and object of experiences. Perhaps we have too quickly forgotten that Anna O, in describing the analytic experience to Freud, beside the even happier expression *talking cure*, had added – as Freud noted with a smile – *chimney sweeping*, a procedure not only coloured by sex, but by exploration, repetition, memories, and soot; getting one's hands dirty to guarantee the intimacy and functioning of the hearth without letting the house burn down. Today we know that the analyst too is "swept" in treatment and that the problem is one of not allowing oneself to be swept *away*. The possibility of anchoring oneself to one's own perceptions guarantees the analyst's position in the session: anchoring oneself in order to be able to move on to an emotional re-provisioning, the indispensable premise for any activity of transformation. Racamier (1992) held that the analyst's position should be one of a "welcoming obstacle". Here the oxymoron conjoins paternal and maternal, not in the sense that the paternal is the obstacle and the maternal is the welcome, but to emphasise through both members of the couple that without an obstacle there can be no true welcome.

I would now like to present an example of the hidden work of perception before analytic speech begins its work of transformation.

I am waiting for a first meeting with a young patient, but two people come into my consulting room: a tall, pale, unwell-looking woman all dressed in black is the patient; with her is another, older woman. I have a sudden thought, in fact a certainty: "the patient was taken ill in the street, and a *passerby* has helped her, bringing her to my consulting room." No word has yet been uttered. Words, a while later, will say that the *passerby* is in fact the patient's mother. (Words will have little to say about this, however, since the *passerby* is in fact the patient's mother.) There are daytime residues in this "dream-delirium": I know that the patient's parents live in another city and I doubt that she was

¹ [Translation by the translator of this article.]

accompanied. But why the illness, the collapse, the display in the street, the perception that the two women were strangers to each other; and, on the other hand, why did I imagine the need for an escort? The answer will come in detail after some years of an analysis consisting of sudden (unexpected) approaches and sudden breaks, during a session (third year of analysis four times a week) in which we talk about real physical illness and the urgent need for a remedy (cure). Now I find myself accompanying the patient, and I do so by concerning myself with the reality of her illness and its possible remedies.

A memory emerges from this accompanying: «My mother, it's not that she can't be deep, she can do lots of things, she plays the piano, she reads, but it's always been as if I didn't need her advice, I was considered the strong one, goodness knows why, the one who knew exactly what to do on every occasion... I remember one time when I must have been ten years old, I went to buy my own glasses; I chose a completely unsuitable frame, a great big plastic one, and when my mother saw me (it), she went back to the shop and said, do you really think this is a frame to give a child, it's even *signed*, but it never occurred to her that she might *accompany* me or tell me straight, look those glasses do not suit you (are all wrong for you)... I had to do it on my own... and my body goes off and does its own thing too. »

It is nothing new that in the first session we look into abysses which only a long analysis will enable us to get to know, but this merely highlights the participation of the analyst's whole body and memories in every analytic session. The analyst has, or should have, depth. In that first meeting, when the skin is most porous, precisely because as yet we know nothing about what is to be said or done, the principles of an original bond are inscribed (set down), the lived experiences of that "intense emotional tie" of which Freud speaks; a tie or bond that challenges patient and analyst to combine their experiences, but also to live out their individual separateness. My facing a situation of strangeness was combined with the patient's implicit question: that of whether she would be accompanied so that her body would not go off "and do its own thing." I have spoken elsewhere about this particular kind of accompaniment (Badoni, 2011).

I believe that what may be at work here, stirred up in the analyst, are sensory memories of her own experiences, but also the work of attention, the intervention of the senses, the activating of recollections: looking, trying and trying again, feeling, so that by means of successive

adjustments, we can find what is congruent for that patient in that moment, as for the child she was then.

This is not a matter of providing “signed” interpretations; rather, in these moments we feel together the pleasure of going through together (recalling) the processes of perception (Zanette *et al.*, 2014). Moreover, mothers often address their *infans* in the plural (for the *infans*, mothers often present themselves as plural), accompanying the child in its experiences as if they were shared (amalgamated), but also encouraging the child to try things out on its own: I’ve tried this, so you can try it too. Therefore this is a plural (we) which combines and also differentiates, promotes and maintains subjective experience. This is no small matter, as I shall try to show.

BODY AND SUBJECT IN THE DEBATE ABOUT INTERSUBJECTIVITY

... I do not give myself/ the companionship of feeling. A deserted ship,/ I sail the sea of life,/ more alone than loneliness. I am a stranger/ to what thinks in me,...

PESSOA, *Faust*²

The current debate about intersubjectivity is broad and diverse, drawing widely on philosophy, on attachment theory, on infant research and on the neurosciences (Bohleber, 2013). In Italy, “field” theory has recently been revisited by Ferro and Civitarese (Ferro and Civitarese, 2013) who have deepened (explored) its metaphorical meaning, that of the gravitational field, and described its laws.

For my part, I would like to emphasise that, despite the gravitational pull into a common relational field, the analytic encounter may be characterised by a marked asymmetry, underlined in the classical analytic setting by the different positions of the patient’s and analyst’s bodies: as a memory of the initial situation of impotence (*Hilflosigkeit*, *Helplessness*), and as a call to take *responsibility*, both being continually renewed points of departure for all possible transformations. The situation is suspended and yet arouses intense emotions, and requires these emotions first of all to be felt, then sustained and, if need be, transformed. So let us return to communication.

² [Translated by the translator of the article.]

The verb 'communicate' is both transitive and intransitive: «trans. to render common, to make known to others what is one's own; for the most part, not material things. Intrans. to be in spoken or written relation with someone» (entry on Italian language, *Enciclopedia Italiana*).

Communication is distinguished by the giving or receiving of information by virtue of the fact that what is communicated belongs to us, in the intransitive sense of being in relation. Good interpretations are distinguished from explanations according to whether or not they are able to communicate in a relationship. On the other hand, the analytic word should be a word that touches (Quinodoz, 2003). There is a secret thinking of the body (secret thinking, a bodily thinking) founded on experiences and memories. This is not a new idea: in 1890 Freud, emphasising the presence of affective thought processes endowed with related somatic forms of expression, wrote, "Even when a person is engaged in *quietly thinking in a string of 'ideas'*, there are a constant series of excitations, corresponding to the content of these ideas, which are discharged into the smooth or striated muscles. These excitations can be made apparent if they are appropriately reinforced, and certain striking and, indeed, *ostensibly 'supernatural'* phenomena can be explained by this means... [including] what is known as 'thought-reading'... (Freud 1890, 287, my italics). "Ostensibly" seems to imply that for Freud the supernatural remains provisional, awaiting clarification.

So there is a thinking linked to perception which is unceasingly at work and of which we are only occasionally aware, when "quietly thinking in a string of 'ideas'" leaves room for the world of sensations, when the body makes its presence felt, when it interrogates us; it is a thinking founded on the "meeting situation" (Aulagnier, 1985), aroused by the enigma posed by the meeting with the mother (Laplanche, 1997), and also on the nature of the experience and of the tie (link). The body plays its part: «In its reiteration, the meaning of the text articulated by the body changes, because with each re-writing it finds a new local context and is constantly generating new readings» (Civitarese, 2011, 51).

However, this raises a question; in this very sequence of operations on the body-text, the fear of betrayal makes itself apparent, as it does in any translation: the subject needs to tolerate an inevitable degree of

betrayal³ so as not to endure dizzying oscillations between alienation and fusion, *vita mea/ mors tua*.

The questions I am asking myself/you are these:

1. How far can the translation of the traces betray the Subject without losing the meaning of the text, of its own being in the world, and hence crossing over into alienation on the one hand and into a pact of subjugation on the other: a body for two? (Joyce McDougall, 1989)
2. How can the analytic situation be rethought so as to avoid the risk of representational competency developing at the expense of freedom or the drive to live? (Ambrosiano, Gaburri, 2008)

SECOND PART

BODILY PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY –

TRANSLATING/ BETRAYING (TRANSLATING TO BETRAY)

I shall address these questions by reflecting on the role of the body and the perception of one's own body in the process of subjectivisation. My ideas come from analytic experience with children, adolescents and adults, and from a form of psychotherapy which was offered to me – as a user – in the years of my training and which I have practised since then as an analyst in various contexts. This training has given me an experience which I continue to rediscover in analytic work: feeling the presence of the other in being present to oneself; a necessary betrayal.

In the Sixties (Seventies), the very years when Bion was working on ways of transforming experience, J. de Ajuriaguerra (who, as we know, was close to Wallon and Merleau Ponty) was connecting his psychoanalytic training with the study of neuropsychology (indeed, he held the Chair of Developmental Neuropsychology at the Collège de France from 1975 to 1981). He writes about a tonic background (tonal foundation) which depends on the neurological organisations that develop over time, and on the modalities of reaction which themselves vary according to the level of maturation, but he adds that both the

³ [Translator's note: the author is alluding here and below to the saying "*tradurre è tradire*", to translate is to betray.]

dynamic tonic background (tonal foundation) and the reactivity are modified according to the *nature of the relationship* (1960).

We should note that Ajuriaguerra places the emphasis on the tonic background (tonal foundation) and on the nature of the relationship: the alternation between states of tension and loosening, alertness and trust, are the first and original basis of any encounter, but it will be the nature of the relationship which allows the members (limbs) participating in it to experience their own limits within this alternation.

On these bases Ajuriaguerra gave shape to a psychotherapy which he called Psychotherapy of Relaxation, with the following setting: the patient is lying down and the analyst is sitting in front of him or her; the cadence is rhythmic, one session per week, the intended outcome is an attempt to feel and possibly talk about what is noticed when one pays attention to the body. The body of the patient and the body of the analyst are mutually observable; the patient has the use of a blanket both for comfort in lying down and for helping him to feel protected. Attention is on the body and on the request that the patient, and naturally we too, pay attention to it. This is all an alternating movement in which we pass from the evocations arising from a reliance on perception, to the return to perception. The game the child plays in dropping objects from its high chair requires someone to pick them up and return them, otherwise it ceases to be a game and becomes evacuation. In our case this means not dropping the observations which the patient makes about his or her own body, but returning them, commenting on them whenever the situation suggests doing so.

For many years, (Badoni, 1989,1994, 2013) in dialogue at varying degrees of distance with a group of analysts from the Swiss and French Societies, and with a small group of Italian colleagues⁴, I have engaged in this form of therapy which my French colleagues, to distinguish it from all forms of “anti-gymnastics”⁵ prefer today to call PPC – Psicoterapia

⁴ Our association was hosted from 1989 at the Faculty of Neuropsychiatry at the University of Pavia, where I was a temporary professor (1985-88). I myself coordinated the work in the early years; then it was taken over by Giuliana Bagnasco, and currently by Daniela Alessi. The participants are Paola Freo, Gaetana Negri, Anna Pezzuto, Giorgio Rossi, Anna Tavani.

⁵ Anti-gymnastics is a method for learning to know one’s own body, pioneered during the 1970s by Thérèse Bertherat.

Psicoanalitica Corporea [Bodily Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy] (Dechaud-Ferbus, 2011). Over the years I have practised this treatment, simplifying it, with three types of patient: those who were not seeking analysis, nor would have been in a position to make use of it, but who were bearing significant sufferings on a somatic level; patients who were in general having an attenuated experience of life and who, once they had been made aware of their proficiency for existing, were able to access analytic work; and lastly, well-analysed patients who were curious about this therapy and probably aware of something “left” unexplored despite their effective analysis.

Here I shall look at the first category. The role of bodily perception is especially evident in the process of subjectivisation in adolescence: translation/betrayal.

Maria, aged twenty, comes to me after a breakdown. The psychotic crisis has left significant sequelae: fear of going out alone, and of the metro, and the feeling that she is being talked about on TV. *Maria is* her symptom: a suffocating pressure across her stomach which obliges her to maintain an upright posture and to avoid wearing tight clothes; everything squeezes her, she feels suffocated. As I often do when the body is foregrounded like this, I ask if her body has given her problems at other moments in her life. *Maria* tells me that in adolescence, because of her “crooked back” she found herself, without being able to do anything about it, imprisoned in a plaster corset up to her breasts; in her great distress she had managed to make a hole in the plaster so that she could breathe. What irritated her most was that the plaster pushed her breasts up without her knowing it, as it were, and without her permission. It will not be hard to connect this experience of being encased in plaster which forcibly shaped her body, with a phobia of particular seriousness for her since she wants to work in the world of fashion: a phobia about mannequins. I realise, however, that my words have been accepted too quickly, without provoking associations. Then I think I should stand on her territory and help her to perceive her body. One day, some time later, *Maria* tries to relax, but I can see that her arms are extremely tense. I touch her right arm: it is very tense. After a while I touch the left and feel it gradually loosen. I comment on this. *Maria* confirms my impression and so I add, «Can we think that the right arm has sent its messengers to the left arm to say I’m coming and there’s nothing to be afraid of? » *Maria* accepts my words with a big smile, experiencing them as a discovery: now she not only knows that she has a body, but that her body can show her the presence of the other and

modulate it; her body is neither passive nor inert. It is not a mannequin. Little by little by little she manages to come on her own and sketches out an experience of work.

*Giulia*⁶, aged 15, is brought by her parents because she is a young girl who does very well at school, but is sad and solitary; eventually anxieties emerge about her body: she often photographs a boil on which she is fixated and which makes her even more withdrawn. In the therapy the difficult family story will emerge, one marked by illnesses, along with Giulia's fear that a look at her ill body will not enable her to recognise herself, but will give her back an experience of alienation. Much of the therapy will be taken up with a movement towards a differentiation between the body as she experiences it and the way the members of her family refer to it.

When she first arrives she carries her body as if it did not belong to her: she makes me think of a sloth because her movements are slow, as if she were struggling to find a centre of gravity; her classmates call her "the ghost" (and sometimes in class Giulia feels as if she is "flying out of her seat"). Between an immobile body and no body, how will she achieve a relationship with time? In one session Giulia says that her mother wanted to take her photo for her identity card; Giulia wonders if the photo she has now will stay the same on the document, or whether after a certain time the photo must be changed (there will be a time when it must change). A boy in her class teases her, saying that she's actually 70 years old, she's a retired teacher who dyes her hair. On another occasion, suffering from "St Anthony's fire" she undergoes an experience of depersonalisation, and wonders if it is a disease of children or old people... I can feel she is anguished (She suffers it in distress) as if it were a mutation, uncontrollable and disturbing.

The change (fluctuations) in her identity makes her oscillate between a fixed identity made of rules, which feels like a corset, and the idea of jumping straight to the next position, "flying" there without letting herself touch the subjective experience of her body which is entering adolescence. When she gets up from the couch at the end of the session she says, «My head is spinning, it's like stopping after spinning round and round,» as if she had been unbalanced by immersing herself in her own corporeality. Indeed it is usually other people who photograph her and take her measurements. However, Giulia gradually begins to find

⁶ My thanks to Dr Anna Pezzuto with whom I shared this case.

interest in taking the measure of herself, starting with feeling her body as an insubordinate object which arouses her curiosity and is not at the command of her mother, her teachers or her friend. Later on she will dare to risk an opening up on the bodily level with regard to sexuality: perceiving the form and warmth of her body is accompanied by the possibility of an exchange with her peers, with whom she starts to feel able to share experiences.

I won't conceal the fact that I practise this therapy with a mixture of anxiety, uncertainty and surprise.

The anxiety is linked to the "nakedness of the setting" (Dechaud-Ferbus, 2011), to that confrontation between patient and analyst with no other rule than an invitation to concern oneself with feeling one's own body; the uncertainty is, for me as analyst, linked to my continual wondering where this therapy is situated in the sphere of psychoanalytic theory and practice; and the surprise is the sudden and unforeseen illumination of memories, figures and representations.

Anxiety: concern with the body is only an apparent limitation of the field, in that the body, seat of the affects, is also the foundation of the Ego (Freud, 1923): it is our "mystic writing pad" (Freud, 1925), a precise recorder of the traces left by the business of living, with its adventures, its catastrophes and its limits. We know very well that behind an apparently innocent request (are we not perhaps speaking of relaxation?) the challenge will be to investigate the origins of the subject, and we can only tolerate this challenge because, as analysts, we are, or think we are equipped to know and support the development of subjectivity.

Hence the *uncertainty*: why do we resort to this setting, when we have another available to us, the classical psychoanalytic setting based on more than a century of experience and supported by volumes and volumes of reflections? Are we betraying psychoanalysis, or are we instead addressing an original betrayal, that which the child must be helped to carry out in order to differentiate him or herself from the mother, a betrayal as inevitable as it is terrifying, capable of inducing recourse to extreme defences, such as splitting and denial? This has given me reason to reflect. What weight does betrayal have in a patient's history? I answer that every process of subjectivisation brings a degree of betrayal, just as every new scientific revelation must be able to address uncertainties and risks. One betrayal leads to another until, as

has been the case for me too, we fear betraying the home-mother, psychoanalysis itself. And what if it were instead a useful territory for research?

Lastly comes *surprise*: it concerns every category of patient and is to do with the characteristics of immediacy which are, I think, specific to this kind of treatment. In the PPC these occurrences seem for the most part like the unexpected revelation of connections and links: such phenomena would not seem to be so much linked to a lightening of the mechanisms of repression, but to a discovery – which I would call *accidental* – of something as unknown to us as it is to the patients themselves. These are probably adjustments of mnestic traces, linked it seems to the possibility of *making experience*, in the tonic (tonal) dialogue which runs back and forth between patient and analyst, of states of self which it was not possible to pay attention and hence to receive a response.

MAKING/ HAVING EXPERIENCE:

COMPETENCE TO REPRESENT/ DRIVE (URGE) TO LIVE

Experience (verb and noun) is defined as «direct personal knowledge acquired by observation, use and the practice of a specific sphere of reality.» Example: «I believe my experience today shows I deserve to be loved for my valour.» Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, XIV, 58 (cited in the *Vocabolario della Enciclopedia Italiana*).⁷

In Italian we speak of ‘*making experience*’, but also of ‘*having experience*’, placing the emphasis on active and passive roles respectively, and undoubtedly on a repeated and constant link, an indispensable premise for being able to learn from experience (Bion,

⁷ [The translation of the Ariosto lines is by the translator of the article. The author’s use of the quotation causes some problems in English, since *esperto* is not generally rendered as “experienced” in this context. See for example, Guido Waldman’s prose version of Ariosto’s lines: “Must a man... be valiant? Then I have shown today, I believe, that I deserve to be loved” (Ariosto, 1974, 144). Furthermore, with regard to the reappearance of the quotation in the next paragraph, *valore* can mean “overall value, worthiness” (as imagined by the child playing the *fort-da* game), and it is true that Ariosto’s speaker, Mandricardo the Tartar, is enumerating *all* his virtues in the stanza in question. However, in the specific line quoted he is referring only to his military prowess.]

1962). Looking, trying, trying again, memorising, practising by following the traces (attempting to follow the traces), are different but connected steps in experience. I feel I should emphasise that experience requires repetition, not necessarily as a mechanical compulsion, but as a vital necessity, as it were a non-surrender of hope and the will to live, a continual attempt to make oneself a little less of a stranger in one's own home. The repetition "resists and asks" (Riolo, 2007), makes use of procedural memories and emotions experienced and re-experienced (undergone and re-undergone). The game with the wooden cotton reel played by Freud's grandson is not limited to representing an absence and reappearance; the child masters the process and makes a physical experience of it by accompanying it with the action of his hand while the eye follows and monitors, and memory records. Through his own game (In this game) the child thus takes possession of a profound experience: "I believe my experience today shows I deserve to be loved for my valour," sang Ariosto. Mamma will come back because I know I exist and have value.

Today we know that the role of the object is not only to satisfy needs and to attend to the creation of mnestic traces (leave mnestic traces), but also to be the *organiser of the psychic experience* (*organise psychic experience*) (Duparc, 2005). Starting with the concept of the drive "as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body" (Freud, 1915, 122), I think it is right to ask ourselves once more, as Freud asked himself, if we can continue to distinguish the psychic sphere and the body as if they were opposed entities. While the body, seat of the affects, becomes the body-EGO (EGO-body) in the structural model, we should not forget that the EGO is not master in its own house, that it is largely unconscious, that in a contest between horse and rider, it is the horse who wins (Freud, 1923). Therefore the body, viewed in a variety of ways, crosses the entire oeuvre of Freud and is a fundamental element of it, however uncertain; perhaps the very open-endedness of Freud's thought leads us today to speak of a third model, the subject model. This "would constitute the theory of the processes and structures which intervene in the construction of subjectivity, in part already present in those that went before and in part elaborated subsequently or yet to be elaborated" (Garella, 2012)⁸. I shall conclude by dwelling for a moment on the readiness of the subjectivating object (subject-making object) (Cahn, 2006) to become engaged with the subject in a form which, comparing

⁸ [Translated by the translator of the article.]

one body with another, opens a challenge of tolerance and freedom: the role of the object is first of all that of not withdrawing, then of being able to tolerate the necessary period of not knowing – not knowing not only what is happening in the subject, but also inside his/her own self (itself). Taking this a step further, we could say that the object must not only tolerate not knowing (negative capability), but also not *being*, so as to allow the other to enjoy its own freedom. I believe the work of PPC has the distinctive feature of “training” negative capability: in fact, this is a matter of a setting which makes the original emerge in its original way, starting from the body. This is not a play on words, but may I think be the treatment’s point of impact, in originating a movement towards differentiation. In PPC, not only are we not afraid of repetition, but we suggest it (through constant reference to the body) and we accompany it: paradoxically, we encourage it.

What makes me uncomfortable sometimes when I hear the term *rêverie* being abused is that, misinterpreting Bion, it is presented as a sort of illumination, one that risks making the mother an omnipotent being endowed with supernatural abilities in the way that troubled Freud: a mother who adjusts and understands everything, but does not help to differentiate (Sarno, 2014). All this overshadows what goes on in the mother’s body, the exercise of survival she must perform, which includes that of keeping alive the woman in the mother, however much effort and patience and anger and availability for navigating the void this may involve, in accompanying the work of differentiation. Negative capability is all this; it is not a stroll in the park. Negative capability is the ability to withstand the indispensable betrayal of every translation, even that of mnestic traces. The role of the subjectivating (subject-making) object is therefore that of recognising the subject and its text in the inevitable betrayal; otherwise relationship becomes contamination, and caring becomes appropriation, sometimes abuse. In the inevitability of betrayal lives my fear of betraying psychoanalysis, which is nevertheless a prompting to go further, tolerating the inevitable necessity (necessary) of bearing the loss of habitual points of reference, of abandoning “signed” interpretations. Perhaps at this point I should say it is not the case for all patients that, whatever the patient says, he is speaking of the analytical pair; I think that patients also need us to consider their reality and their ways of living it.

ENGLISH ABSTRACT.

This paper presents a reflection on the status of the body in psychoanalytic theory and practice. In particular, beginning with Freud's consideration of telepathic experience, it investigates the qualities of the analyst's receptive apparatus, the ways in which the presence of the other is perceived, and how this experience of meeting can be accepted and communicated. Placing the idea of *chimney sweeping* alongside that of the *talking cure*, it proposes the necessity for the analyst to "get her hands dirty" if she really wants to accompany her patient in the exploration of the unconscious. In this connection, alongside reflections drawn from traditional analytic practice, some considerations are made deriving from psychotherapeutic work such as the "Psychotherapy of Relaxation" in the tradition of de Ajuriaguerra's thought, subsequently developed in the French psychoanalytic school as Corporeal Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (PPC). **KEY WORDS:** Communication, body, perception, subject.

REFERENCES

- Ajuriaguerra J. de, Cahen, M. (1960). Tonus corporel et relation avec autrui. L'expérience tonique au cours de la relaxation. Premier Congrès de Méd. Psychosomat. de langue fr. Vittel 8-10 juillet *Rev. De Méd. Psychosomatique Psychosom.*, 2, 89-124
- Ambrosiano L. Gaburri E. (2008). *La spinta a esistere*. Roma, Borla.
- Andreoli A. (1989). Il corpo come luogo del rapporto dell'Io col proprio limite. In : Badoni, M., Lanzi, G. (Eds.) *Il Corpo tra Piacere e Realtà*. Pavia. La Goliardica Pavese, 1990.
- Aulagnier P. (1985). Naissance d'un corps, origine d'une histoire. Rencontre psychanalytique d'Aix en Provence. Corps et Histoire. Paris. Belles Lettres.
- Badoni M. (1989). Un corpo per pensare. In: Badoni, M. Lanzi, G. (Eds.) *Il Corpo tra Piacere e Realtà*. Pavia. La Goliardica Pavese. Pavia
- Badoni M. (1994). Corps maîtrisé et corps soigné: relaxation et facteurs traumatiques externes et internes à la cure. In

Dechaud-Ferbus M., Roux M.L., Sacco F., *Les destins du corps*.
Toulouse, Érès.

Badoni M. (2008) Il corpo, tra riconoscimento e alienazione. Study group at San Carlo College in the context of the conference: Meeting the other, avoiding the other – Emotions and narratives.

Badoni M. (2011). The Accompanying Function in Psychoanalytic Work. EPF 24th Annual Conference Copenhagen, 15 April 2011.

Badoni M. (2013). L'alieno. Paper given at the Colloquium on PPC , Paris, 28 September 2013.

Bion W.R. (1962). *Learning from Experience*. London, Tavistock

Bohleber W. (2013) The Concept of Intersubjectivity in Psychoanalysis : Taking critical stock. *Int.J. Psychoanal.* 94, 799-823

Cahn, R. (2006). Origini e destini della Soggettivazione. In: Richard, F. Wainrib S. (Eds.) *La Soggettivazione*, Roma, Borla, 2008.

Chetrit-Vatine V. (2004). Primal Seduction, Matricial Space and Asymmetry in the Psychoanalytic Encounter. *Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 85, 841-856.

Civitarese G. (2008). *The Intimate Room: Theory and Technique of the Analytic Field*. London. Routledge, 2010.

Civitarese, G. (2011). *The Violence of Emotions: Bion and post-Bionian Psychoanalysis*. London, Routledge, 2012.

Dechaud-Ferbus M. (2011). *Cet autre divan*. Paris, PUF, Le fil rouge.

Duparc F. (2005). L'excitation et sa mise en cadre. *Rev. Française de Psychanalyse*, 2005,1, 75-84.

Fachinelli E. (1985). *Claustrofilia*. Milano, Adelphi.

Ferro, A. (2007). *Avoiding Emotions, Living Emotions*. Hove, East Sussex, Brunner-Routledge, London, 2011.

Ferro A. (2014). *Nelle viscere della mente. Sillabario emotive e narrazioni*. Milano, Cortina.

Ferro A. Civitarese G. (2013). The Meaning and Use of Metaphor in Analytic Field Theory. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry*, 33, 190-209.

Freud S. (1890). *Psychical (or Mental) Treatment*. S.E. 7

Freud S. (1915). Instincts and their Vicissitudes. S.E.14

Freud S. (1916). Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. S.E.15.

Freud S. (1921). Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy. S.E.18.

Freud S. (1923). The Ego and the Id. S.E. 19.

Freud S. (1925). A Note Upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad'. S.E.19.

Gaddini E. (1980). Notes on the Mind Body Question. *Int.J. Psychoanal.*, (1987), 68, 315-329.

Garella A. (2012). La questione della terza topica e la posizione del soggetto in psicoanalisi. *Riv. Psicoanal.*, 4, 843-864.

Green A. (1973). *Le discours vivant*. Paris, Puf.

Johnson M. (1987). *The Body in the mind*. Chicago and London. The University of Chicago Press.

Laplanche J. (1997). The Theory Of Seduction And The Problem Of The Other. *Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 78, 653-666.

McDougall J. (1989). *Theatres of the Body: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Psychosis and Illness*. London, Free Association Books.

Nissim L. (1989). *L'ascolto rispettoso*. Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Quinodoz D. (1994) *Emotional Vertigo, between Anxiety and Pleasure*. London, Routledge, 1997.

Quinodoz D. (2003). Words that touch. *Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 84, 1469-1485.

Racamier P-C. (1992), *Le Génie des origines. Psychanalyse et Psychoses*. Paris, Editions Payot.

Riolo F. (2007). Ricordare ripetere e rielaborare: un lascito di Freud alla psicoanalisi futura. *Riv. Psicoanal.* 53, 439-446.

Sarno M. (2014). Degrado e conformismo nelle appartenenze pericolose. Giornata in ricordo di Eugenio Gaburri. Milano, Casa della Cultura. 25 January 2014.

Servadio E. (1955). A Presumptively Telepathic Precognitive dream during Analysis. *Int. J. Psicoanal.*, 36, 27-30.

Zanette M.- Vizziello. P. - Rapezzi. L-Nacinovich. R,-Conti. P, -Bonfiglio, S. Basile, R.- Barbieri, G.-Balottari. C. Clinica dei microprocessi in psicoanalisi. Milan Centre of Psychoanalysis, 16 January 2014.

Marta Badoni

Via Cosimo del Fante, 3

20122 Milano

e-mail: marta.badoni@iol.it